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2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Civil Liability for Motor Vehicle Crashes in the United States: From Conventional Vehicles to Autonomous Vehicles

verfasst von : Mark A. Geistfeld

Erschienen in: Autonomous Vehicles and Civil Liability in a Global Perspective

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

As of June 1, 2020, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes expressly addressing autonomous vehicles. These regulations largely address the preconditions for operating autonomous vehicles, including rules that govern operators and technical features of the automated driving systems. Only a few states have established independent frameworks for determining liability in the event of a crash. Federal legislation governing autonomous vehicles has yet to be enacted, but developments thus far strongly suggest that federal regulations will ultimately determine the important safety performance standards required of autonomous vehicles. Federal law is supreme over state law, and so federal regulations will preempt any conflicting state law requirements and immunize a compliant autonomous vehicle from tort liability. However, if a vehicle does not comply with an applicable federal safety standard and crashes as a result, the responsible party will be subject to state tort liability for the injuries. But until federal legislation or regulation has been enacted, state law will wholly govern the space. In the absence of state legislation, state tort law will determine liability for the crash of an autonomous vehicle. In the vast majority of states, manufacturers will be subject to strict products liability for any defects that cause their vehicles to crash.

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Vorheriges Kapitel South Africa: Motor Vehicle Collisions Liability Regime Applied to Automated Vehicles

Nächstes Kapitel Self-Driving Cars Regulation in Colombia

According to court data collected from seventeen states, auto tort cases in 2015 ranged from a low of 32 percent of all tort cases (Missouri) to 75 percent (Texas), with auto tort cases exceeding 50 percent of all tort cases in the majority of these states. See 2015 Statewide Auto Tort Cases per 100,000 Population, National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, <http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil.aspx> (follow “Launch DataViewer” hyperlink; then select “Statewide Auto Tort Rates (Chart)”). “Auto tort cases arise from auto accidents and typically allege personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death resulting from negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” Id.

For comprehensive discussion of how state tort law is likely to apply to the crash of an autonomous vehicle, see Geistfeld (2017), p. 1611 (hereinafter “Roadmap”). The ensuing discussion is derived from this article in ways not fully communicated by the varied references.

U.S. Constitution art. VI, cl. 2 (commanding that the laws of the United States ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; … any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding’).

See Maggie Miller, Action on Driverless Cars Hits Speed Bump as Congress Focuses on Pandemic, The Hill (May 20, 2020), <https://thehill.com/policy/technology/498863-action-on-driverless-cars-hits-speed-bump-as-congress-focuses-on-pandemic>.

For citations to prior legislation and more extensive discussion, see Geistfeld (2018), p. 337 (hereinafter “Regulatory Sweet Spot”).

U.S. Dept. of Transp., Automated Vehicles 3.0: Preparing for the Future of Transportation (Oct. 2018), <https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/policy-initiatives/automated-vehicles/320711/preparing-future-transportation-automated-vehicle-30.pdf>.

See, e.g., Cal. Vehicle Code § 38750 (“Existing law authorizes the operation of an autonomous vehicle on public roads for testing purposes by a driver who possesses the proper class of license for the type of vehicle operated if specified requirements are satisfied.”); Iowa Code § 321.515 (“A driverless-capable vehicle may operate on the public highways of this state without a conventional human driver physically present in the vehicle. …”).

See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482A.060 (“Before a person begins testing an autonomous vehicle on a highway within this State, the person must 1. Submit to the Department proof of insurance or self- insurance acceptable to the Department in the amount of $5,000,000; or 2. Make a cash deposit or post and maintain a surety bond or other acceptable form of security with the Department in the amount of $5,000,000.”); Tex. Transp. Code § 545.452 (“An automated motor vehicle may not operate on a highway in this state with the automated driving system engaged unless the vehicle is … covered by motor vehicle liability coverage or self-insurance in an amount equal to the amount of coverage that is required under the laws of this state.”).

For more detailed information, see National Conference of State Legislatures, Autonomous Vehicles State Bill Tracking Database, <https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislative-database.aspx>.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-30-106.

See Utah Code Ann. § 11 41-26-104(3) (stating that the automated driving system (ADS) “is responsible for compliant operation of an ADS-dedicated vehicle”).

Crash Avoidance Metrics P’ship (CAMP) Automated Vehicle Research (AVR) Consortium, Key Considerations in the Development of Driving Automation Systems 2 (2014), http://www-esv.nhtsa.dot.gov/Proceedings/24/files/24ESV-000451.PDF [https://perma.cc/MZ62-TK7C].

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Facts DOT HS 812 115 (Feb. 2015), <https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115>.

Commercial distributors of a defective product are also subject to strict products liability but will not be expressly mentioned in the ensuing discussion.

Anderson et al. (2010), pp. 10–11.

Id. 1 & 8.

See generally Engstrom (2011), p. 805.

Engstrom (2012), p. 306 (detailing the individual states).

Id. at 320.

See generally Geistfeld (2020) (hereinafter “Products Liability”).

See, e.g., Friedman v. State of New York, 493 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1896) (permitting recovery only when the unsafe road condition stems from “ministerial” rather than “policy” decisions by the governmental authority).

Utah Code Ann. § 11 41-26-104.

See Geistfeld, Roadmap (2017), pp. 1624–1629.

See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 30 (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (“An actor is not liable for harm when the tortious aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm.”).

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (defining defect in terms of a product that malfunctions by failing “to perform its manifestly intended function”).

Choi (2019), p. 44.

See generally id. (arguing that liability for software malfunctions that cause physical products to malfunction be determined by a negligence rule of “crashworthiness” that asks whether the code “adequately incorporates state-of-the-art techniques in software fault tolerance”).

“Monitoring the entire manufacturing process in terms of quality … could prove difficult considering that satisfactory manufacturing quality can only be achieved by rapid screening of materials at the input stage, transformation process stage within the manufacturing hub and finally at the output stage before shipment to the customer.” Oduoza (2020). In such a manufacturing environment, it “may not be feasible to evaluate every single item going through the process and also at the output. Rather, acceptance sampling is used for quality assurance.” But even this method of quality control is limited. In particular, “[d]uring mass production it is very difficult using conventional quality control methods to find defects of the order of ppm or less at the stage of design and production.” Id. at 4.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. a.

Id. See also Geistfeld, Products Liability (2020), pp. 83–106 (explaining why product malfunctions rely on the same rationale for strict liability applicable to construction or manufacturing defects).

See Geistfeld, Roadmap (2017), pp. 1669–1674.

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 3 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1998).

Furda and Vlacic (2011), p. 10; see also, e.g., Arnay et al. (2016), p. 23 (“The problem we want to solve is safely following a predefined route while avoiding dynamic obstacles.”). In general, any “information processing system” embodies a “computational theory [that] corresponds to the goal of computation and an abstract definition of the task.” Alpaydin (2016), p. 20. For autonomous vehicles, the “abstract definition of the task” includes arriving safely at the specified destination along with other factors such as minimizing the time or length of trip.

Anders Eugensson et al., Environmental, Safety, Legal and Societal Implications of Autonomous Driving Systems (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Research Paper No. 13-0467, 2013), www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv23/23ESV-000467.PDF [https://perma.cc/KC4W-QLVL]; see also Richard Waters, CES 2016: Toyota Poaches Google Exec to Help Lead AI Effort, Financial Times, Jan. 5, 2016, at 15 (reporting that the “ultimate goal” of Toyota’s driverless car program is to create “a car that cannot be responsible for a collision”).

Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 701 S.E.2d 5, 14 n.12, 15 (finding that only seventeen different states expressly reject consumer expectations in favor of the risk-utility test).

Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 306 (Cal. 1994).

Id. at 309.

See, e.g., Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 742 (Wis. 2001) (“[A] condition not contemplated by the ordinary consumer[] does not inevitably require any degree of scientific understanding about the product itself. Rather, it requires understanding of how safely the ordinary consumer would expect the product to serve its intended purpose.”).

See Mark A. Geistfeld, Why the Next Person Hit By a Driverless Car Might Not Be Able to Sue, Time, March 30, 2018, http://time.com/5221393/uber-autonomous-vehicle-death-settlement/ (discussing these cases and proposing that during the period of premarket testing, manufacturers be obligated to pay no-fault compensation to injured bystanders).

Boeglin (2015), p. 174.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (applying strict liability to defective products that are “unreasonably dangerous”).

Surden and Williams (2016), p. 148.

See Lipson and Kurman (2016), p. 17 (“As cars pool their driving ‘experience’ in the form of data, each car will benefit from the combined experience of all other cars.”).

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: Accelerating the Next Revolution in Roadway Safety 5 (2016), https://one.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/av/pdf/Federal_Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSX9-B6J6].

See Geistfeld, Products Liability (2020), pp. 107–143.

See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (adopting “a reasonableness (‘risk-utility balancing’) test as the standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs,” which “asks whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design by the seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the product not reasonably safe”).

Geistfeld, Roadmap (2017), p. 1653.

See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (discussing how the term “state of the art” has been variously defined by a multitude of courts; for some it refers to industry custom or practice; for others it means the safest existing technology that has been adopted for use; for others it means cutting-edge technology).

Abraham and Rabin (2019), p. 145.

Id. 145 n. 40.

Id. at 129.

For more extensive discussion of why this approach best fits the existing federal statutory framework for regulating the safe performance of motor vehicles—a framework likely to be maintained by any new legislation governing autonomous vehicles—see Geistfeld, Regulatory Sweet Spot (2018).

See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. i (Am. Law Inst. 1998) (“Warnings alert users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they can prevent harm either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption or by choosing not to use or consume.”).

Another way to satisfy the tort obligation is by apprising consumers about the full cost of insuring the autonomous vehicle, because the insurance premium is based on the underlying risk of crash. See Geistfeld, Roadmap (2017), pp. 1654–1660.

Alexander Hars, Inventivio GmbH, Top Misconceptions of Autonomous Cars and Self-Driving Vehicles 4, http://www.driverless-future.com/?page_id=774 [https://perma.cc/UAJ8-EX6N].

See, e.g., Larry Greenemeier, Driverless Cars Will Face Moral Dilemmas, Scientific American (June 23, 2016), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/driverless-cars-will-face-moral-dilemmas [https://perma.cc/CTV3-5ZGS].

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 1965).

An actor’s conduct is “negligent if the magnitude of the risk [foreseeably created by the conduct] outweighs the burden of risk prevention.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 3 cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2010). In problem at hand, the foreseeable risk created by the driving behavior involves the threatened fatal injuries to bystanders, whereas the burden of preventing that risk involves exposing the occupants of the vehicle to the fatal risk. Because the interests of bystanders are given the same weight as the interests of the vehicle’s occupants, it would be negligent to design the vehicle so that it chooses to injure a larger number of individuals to prevent the same injury for a smaller number.

See Surden and Williams (2016), pp. 163–174 (discussing how “the activities of autonomous vehicles … can be made more predictable through deliberate technological design decisions”).

In a tort suit, both parties typically need legal representation, and so by eliminating tort liability, no-fault auto insurance can reduce total costs for consumers by channeling claims for compensation into systems of first-party insurance. See also Geistfeld, Products Liability (2020), pp. 65–71 (providing other reasons why first-party insurance mechanisms reduce costs for consumers relative to the cost of injury compensation supplied through the tort system).

See generally Engstrom (2012) (explaining this rationale for no-fault auto insurance and arguing that the plans adopted by states fatally undermined the objective of reducing insurance costs by placing the insurance obligation on auto insurers rather than first-party insurers).

Abraham KS, Rabin RL (2019) Automated vehicles and manufacturer responsibility for accidents: a new legal regime for a new era. Va Law Rev 105:127

Alpaydin E (2016) Machine learning: the new AI, p 20

Anderson JM et al (2010) RAND, The U.S. experience with no-fault automobile insurance: a retrospective, pp 10–11

Arnay R et al (2016) Safe and reliable path planning for the autonomous vehicle Verdino. IEEE Intell Transp Syst Mag 8:22CrossRef

Boeglin J (2015) The costs of self-driving cars: reconciling freedom and privacy with tort liability in autonomous vehicle regulation. Yale J Law Technol 17:171

Choi B (2019) Crashworthy code. Wash Law Rev 94:39

Engstrom NF (2011) Sunlight and settlement mills. N Y Univ Law Rev 86:805

Engstrom NF (2012) An alternative explanation for no-fault’s “demise”. DePaul Law Rev 61:303

Furda A, Vlacic L (2011) Enabling safe autonomous driving in real-world city traffic using multiple criteria decision making. IEEE Intell Transp Syst Mag 3:4CrossRef

Geistfeld MA (2017) A roadmap for autonomous vehicles: state tort liability, automobile insurance, and federal safety regulation. Calif Law Rev 105:1611

Geistfeld MA (2018) The regulatory sweet spot for autonomous vehicles. Wake For Law Rev 53:337

Geistfeld MA (2020) Principles of products liability, 3rd edn

Lipson H, Kurman M (2016) Driverless: intelligent cars and the road ahead, p 17

Oduoza CF (2020) Quality control perspectives during mass production with a focus on the chemical industry. IntechOpen. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90203

Surden H, Williams M-A (2016) Technological opacity, predictability, and self-driving cars. Cardozo Law Rev 38:121

Titel: Civil Liability for Motor Vehicle Crashes in the United States: From Conventional Vehicles to Autonomous Vehicles
verfasst von: Mark A. Geistfeld
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Autonomous Vehicles and Civil Liability in a Global Perspective
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-41991-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-41992-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41992-8_4

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